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Was Singapore Extraordinary?  







Although the mere observation of saving aggregates might have us believe differently, this article 
argues  that  Singapore’s  sustained  high  saving  performance  was  far  from  extraordinary  once  the 
country’s  particular  circumstances  are  econometrically  controlled  for.  Singapore’s  saving 
performance should therefore not be regarded as a mere blip in economic history. As a matter of fact, 
not the high saving rates in the late 1980s and 1990s, which usually attract the most attention, but 
rather the speed of transformation of the country’s saving behaviour in the first years of independence 
is  shown  to  be  indeed  extraordinary.  Singapore  was  able  to  overcome  its  low  initial  saving 
performance  much  faster  and  much  more  strongly  than  could  have  been  expected  given  its 
circumstances. 
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1. Introduction
2 
Singapore’s real per capita GNP measured in 1990 constant Singapore dollars stood at S$4,224 in 
1965, the year of the country’s separation from the Federation of Malaysia, which marked its final step 
towards independence. By 1999 this figure had increased more than eight-fold to S$34,965. Converted 
at  purchasing-power-parities,  this  ranked  Singapore  seventh  in  the  world  -  one  rank  behind 
Switzerland.
3 The country’s economy managed an average compound growth rate of aggregate real 
GNP of 8.5 per cent annually for the first 35 years since its independence. 
  
While there still is controversy over exactly how much of this spectacular growth performance 
can be attributed to productivity improvements and how much to capital accumulation, the discussion 
by now seems to be about which shade of grey is the most appropriate one. Both sides agree that the 
majority of Singapore’s growth was due to capital accumulation.
4 This brings Singapore’s saving 
behaviour to the forefront of the discussion. In 1965 Singapore saved 11.2% of its GNP, which was 
already a big improvement from negative savings in the early 1960s. In 1961 and 1962 the Gross 
National Saving (GNS) Ratio stood at -2.4% and -2.3% respectively. By 1984 Singapore had further 
raised its GNS-ratio to 45.6%, among the highest in the world. After a short-lived decline of the ratio 
in the second half of the 1980s, national saving increased again to a peerless 54% of GNP in 1999.
5  
 
The nation’s savings has always been considered central to the country’s economic development. 
Dr. Goh Keng-Swee, the nation’s first finance minister and a permanent member of the government 
cabinet until 1984, summarised the government’s understanding of the importance of savings in a 
1979 speech: 
 
How was it possible for a small island state with no natural resources to achieve 
such an economic performance? A detailed answer would have to describe many 
complicated  economic  as  well  as  political  and  social  issues.  Here  I  want  to 
briefly discuss one crucial element in our recent economic progress to which 
inadequate attention was paid in the past. This is the role of domestic savings. 
There is no real secret about the way in which nations and individuals grow rich. 
They must save a good part of their incomes and invest their savings profitably. 
The more you save and the more wisely you invest, the faster you get rich.
6 
 
                                                       
2 This article forms part of a larger research project (Hopf, 2004), which has benefited from many helpful comments by 
various people, access to research facilities and financial support from various sources, particularly: Professor Mukul Asher, 
Dudley Baines, Prof. Nick Crafts, Philip Epstein, Prof. Gregg Huff, Associate Professor Gavin Peebles, Catherine Schenk, 
Professor  Amina  Tyabji  and  Associate  Professor  Peter  Wilson;  the  Institute  of  South  East  Asia  Studies,  the  Monetary 
Authority  of  Singapore  and  the  National  University  of  Singapore;  the  Economic  History  Society,  the  ESRC,  the  LSE 
Conference Fund, The Royal Historical Society and the University of London’s Central Research Fund. 
3 World Bank (2001), p. 275 
4 For summaries of the TFP literature on Singapore see for example Owyong and Thangavelu (2002), Peebles and 
Wilson (2002, pp. 58-65), Miles and Scott (2002, pp.106-111) and International Monetary Fund (2000, pp. 6-8). 
5 Singapore’s Gross Domestic Saving in 1999 equalled 52% of its GDP. The average in East Asia stood at 37% and 
among the world’s high-income countries at 22%. The closest to Singapore was Angola with 48% and China with 42%. 
(World Bank, 2000) 
6 Goh (1995, p.78) in a speech given in 1979 to Singapore’s National Trade Union Congress. After his retirement from 
parliament, Dr. Goh also held the post of Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore from 1985-1992 
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Singapore’s average annual Gross Domestic Saving Ratio for the 35 years from 1965-99 stood at 
36.13% of its GDP, which equals about double the world average.
7 The country’s saving performance 
becomes even more dramatic if we look at the latter half of the period only. Annual GDS-ratios for the 
years 1981-99 average out at 45.6%, while the world’s average was 15.8%. From 1995 onwards 
Singapore’s Gross Domestic Saving accounted for more than 50% of her Gross Domestic Product. 
 
Such a sustained high-saving performance is easily seen as a mere outlier in economic history. 
However, so far no attempt has been made to quantify the degree of extra-ordinarity.
8 This article 
intends to fill this gap by establishing how much Singapore’s saving might have been ‘sui generis’ 
indeed and therefore how much we can truly learn from it. Additionally, it tries to quantify how much 
policy choices in Singapore mattered, by normalising for influences on the country’s national saving 
rates other than (saving) policies so that it can be seen to what degree Singapore’s saving performance 
was due to exogenous factors. In other words, the exercise tries to establish what saving rates could 
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Singapore’s over-/undersaving refers to the country’s savings above/below the econometrically established 
benchmark using model 5 described below. 
For data sources and descriptions see notes at the end of the article. 
                                                       
7 The average given is an unweighted average of Singapore’s 35 annual GDS-ratios for 1965-99. If the ratios were 
weighted by the respective GDPs of each year the overall saving ratio would stand at 46.13% since more recent years with 
higher GDPs and higher saving ratios would attract a higher weight. 
8 For a critical assessment of past investigations into Singapore’s saving behaviour see Hopf (2006) 
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2. Methodology: The Benchmarking Process 
In a series of ten articles between 1956-67 Kuznets analysed inter-country variation in principal 
components  of  the  gross  national  product  and  compared  these  results  to  historical  changes  in 
developed countries.
9 This research gave rise to Chenery and Syrquin’s investigation of over 100 
countries  for  the  period  1950-75.  Twenty-eight  independent  variables  describing  accumulation, 
allocation,  demographic  and  distributional  processes  were  independently  regressed  on  semi-log 
functions  with  income,  population  and  net  capital  inflows  as  explanatory  variables.
10  One  of  the 
dependent variables investigated was the countries’ GDS-ratios. Chenery and Syrquin were trying to 
summarise the relationships of these processes along growth paths and thus establish certain ‘Patterns 
of Development’, particularly structural changes of the economy as the country increases its level of 
economic  development  defined  as  per  capita  income.  They  also  realised  but  did  not  exploit  the 
possibility to use their work for the derivation of benchmarks, which is the route this article will take 
rather than investigating development patterns.
11 
 
By deriving best-fit regressions for the world sample (excluding the country under investigation) 
and then inserting the respective country’s actual data for the explanatory variables, an ‘expected 
value’ for the dependent variable is obtained. The relationship of this expected value with the actual 
value can be investigated over time to highlight significant deviations in certain periods.  
 
Applied to Singapore’s saving performance, this exercise aims to obtain benchmark values for 
Singapore’s GDS-ratio controlling for those explanatory variables, which prove to be significant in 
modelling  the  variation  in  GDS-ratios  across  a  world  sample.  Moreover,  the  pool  of  potential 
explanatory variables is being restricted to those, which are not, or only to a limited degree influenced 
by the countries’ policies. As a result the statistical model determines how much of the variance 
between individual countries’ savings performance can be explained by variables exogenous to the 
countries’ respective policy choices.
12 The modelling process works its way through three levels of 
control. The initial level controls only for the strictly non-policy environment. The second step adds 
the country’s external situation and finally a peer-group factor is incorporated. Inserting Singapore’s 
actual data into such a model will tell us how much the country should have been expected to save 
given  her  particular  circumstances.  What  remain  un-modelled  are  largely  country-specific  issues, 
which are open to policy choices. 
 
Linear regression models are estimated both on an annual and on a pooled (fixed-effects) basis. A 
full panel data analysis is unfortunately prohibited due to the sample properties, particularly the fact 
that it does not consist of a constant set of countries with observations for all years. Countries, which 
report  data  irregularly,  would  need  to  be  excluded  in  order  to  allow  for  a  minimum  time-series 
dimension for each country.
13 Moreover, it is likely that such an exclusion leads to a systematic bias in 
                                                       
9 Journal of Economic Development and Cultural Change, various issues 1956-67. 
10 Chenery and Syrquin (1975). In a later study, Syrquin and Chenery (1989), the period was extended to cover 1950 – 
1983 and the sample size comprised 108 countries. Crafts (1984) applies their approach to 19th century Europe and Leamer 
(1987) extends the methodology to a three-factor, n-good General Equilibrium Model. 
11 Chenery and Syrquin (1975, p. 4): “By comparing countries that are following similar development patterns, it is 
possible  to  derive  more  valid  performance  standards  and  also  compare  the  policies  chosen  by  countries  under  similar 
conditions.” 
12 Generally, policy can impact the regression analysis in two ways. Policy can influence the respective variable’s 
effect on savings, i.e. its coefficient, and also impact the observed level of the variable. The former effect is controlled for by 
the use of a world sample, i.e. Singapore is given the same impact the variable has in average across the world. The selection 
of the variables tries to contain the impact of the latter effect by prohibiting policy induced factors from being modelled. 
13 Loayza et al. (2000), for example, lose every twentieth observation in their sample by limiting its coverage to those 
countries with at least five consecutive annual observations. Hopf - HSBA Working Paper-Nr. 02/2009       5
the sample. Therefore, it was decided to conduct both pooled and annual analyses. Furthermore, both 
general-to-specific elimination of insignificant variables and specific-to-general addition of potentially 
significant variables were used in separate model construction approaches. 
 
A pooled sample, in which all observations across the whole time-period are included no matter 
from which year they stem, assumes that no differences between certain time-periods exist. In other 
words, whether country A achieved its respective saving ratio in year X does not matter. What matters 
is that it achieved it with the respective values of its explanatory variables. However, the (true) impact, 
i.e. the coefficients, of these variables might differ significantly over time and between time periods, 
particularly with such strong world-wide economic events as, for example, the oil-crisis years as part 
of the sample period. The use of annual time-dummies helps somewhat in capturing time-specific sub-
period influences. However, it will not allow for the development of individual coefficients over time. 
Therefore,  on  the  one  hand,  the  explanatory  quality  of  fixed-effects  models  must  be  considered 
generally weaker than that of annual models. On the other hand, they are still much preferable over 
simple averaged models, in which the observations for the individual variables have been averaged 
over the whole period, since this causes the complete loss of the time dimension in the model. With 
fixed-effects models at least the respective relationship of the individual variables at a given time is 
taken into consideration by the regression analysis even though the final coefficient is fixed for the 
whole period. 
 
The removal criterion for the general-to-specific elimination of variables is a joint-hypothesis F-
Test of the variable’s coefficient. A maximum probability of the F-statistic of 0.1 was allowed for the 
variable to remain in the model.
14 Variables were removed from the model in individual steps, i.e. one 
at  a  time.  The  additional use  of  a specific-to-general  method  of  equation  construction  was  made 
necessary since the general-to-specific model will require the countries to have observations for all the 
variables, no matter whether they turn out to be significant or not. The general-to-specific model will, 
therefore, almost always have a smaller sample size than the specific-to-general model, which only 
requires observations for all significant variables. Additionally, the specific-to-general method has the 
advantage of showing the incremental impact of individual variables, which is particularly important 
in order to separately capture the impact of the three main explanatory dimensions of non-policy, 
external and peer-group effects. 
 
The possible existence and impact of a number of potential statistical pitfalls, such as multi-
collinearity,  heteroskedasticity  or  simultaneity,  was  investigated  in  a  comprehensive  sensitivity 
analysis in order to highlight their likely effect on Singapore’s benchmark savings. The statistical 
software package employed for all statistical computations was SPSS version 10.07. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
14 A more stringent criterion for the removal of individual explanatory variables has been proposed by Edward Leamer 
(1985).  In  his  attempt  to  try  to  identify  robust  empirical  relations  in  the  economic  growth  literature  he  developed  the 
‘extreme-bounds test’, which in essence amounts to saying that if one finds a single regression for which the sign of an 
individual coefficient changes or becomes insignificant, then the variable is not (absolutely) robust and should be dropped. 
For a critical assessment of Leamer’s extreme-bounds test see Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin (1997, p.178-9), who argues that the 
test is too severe for almost any variable to pass it. The Joint-Hypothesis-Test, on the other hand, determines whether an 
equation with the variable in question is significantly different from the equation without that variable. Hopf - HSBA Working Paper-Nr. 02/2009       6
3. Literature Review 
The question of high-savings in Singapore has attracted a fair share of interest. This stems from 
the fact that over the last four decades saving rates have experienced a marked divergence which has 
been particularly dramatic within the developing world: saving rates have risen steadily in East Asia, 
stagnated in Latin America, and generally fallen in sub-Saharan Africa.
15 These regional disparities 
have been closely matched by diverging growth experiences: across world regions, higher saving rates 
tend to be correlated with higher income growth.
16 A substantial number of studies have therefore used 
cross-country regression analyses to explain the variance either in international growth experiences or 
in  saving  performances.  However,  almost  none  of  these  investigations  have  tried  to  derive  a 
benchmark value for any of the countries in their sample. These studies are purely interested in finding 
the reasons for the countries’ respective economic performance, not in establishing what performance 
could have been expected given the countries’ respective circumstances. 
 
Using regression analysis to obtain benchmark saving values for specific countries has not often 
been  undertaken.
17  Denizer  and  Wolf  (1998)  use  this  method  to  model  savings  for  twenty-five 
transition economies in Eastern and Central Europe as an attempt to estimate forced savings before the 
transition to a free-market economy. Yashiro and Oishi (1997) built a simultaneous equations model 
for  the  Japanese  economy  to  forecast  savings  largely  depending  on  changes  in  the  country’s 
demographic composition. Besanger et al. (2000) apply an economic modelling exercise to five Asian 
countries, among them Singapore, largely to predict the country’s optimal future saving path.
18 
 
Denizer and Wolf (1998), however, still mix policy-induced and non-policy induced variables, so 
that the explanatory power of their benchmark is somewhat dubious in nature. Their models with r-
squared  between  0.55  and  0.63  and  131  observations  taken  from  an  unspecified  set  of  market 
economies  of,  in  their  view,  comparable  development  levels  show  that  individual  ex-communist 
countries were far from their predicted equilibrium, free-market saving rates. The models include as 
explanatory variables, which the authors refer to as fundamentals: the dependency ratio, urbanization-
ratio, GDP growth, M2 to GDP ratio, inflation, changes in terms of trade, per capita GDP and a 
dummy for military conflict. The study, however, is plagued by a number of problems, foremost by 
the lack of a specification of the ‘control group’, i.e. the set of countries on which the initial regression 
is run. Furthermore, the restriction of the control group to ‘comparable’ countries also limits the power 
of the analysis. A world sample, in this case excluding all the former planned economies, would have 
been preferable particularly because the inclusion of a per capita income variable already controls for 
                                                       
15 Particularly comparisons between East Asia and Latin America have been common. See for example: Singh (1997), 
Birdsall and Jaspersen (1997), Dayal-Gulati and Thimann (1997) to name just a few. Also see Meier (1995, pp.33-61) for a 
summary of the stylized facts of comparative economic development in the LDCs post WW-II, offering a concise overview 
of East Asia, Latin America, Sub-Sahara, and Chinese economic development with references to all the main generalizations 
and many of the remaining questions. 
16 Loayza et al. (2000, p. 165) 
17  See  Haque  et  al.  (1999)  and Loayza  et  al.  (2000)  for  recent  reviews  of  the  literature  regarding  cross-country 
regression analyses of saving ratios. 
18 Two related examples of an attempt at benchmarking using econometric techniques are Ostry (1997) and Kim and 
Roemer (1981). Ostry (1997) models Current Account Balances for five Asian economies, including Singapore. He finds that 
expectations  of  future  income  growth  appear  to  be  a  significant  determinant,  economically  and  statistically,  of  current 
account behaviour in the sample of countries and that the CA deficits in the ASEAN region have primarily reflected high 
levels  of  investment  rather  than  excessive  private  consumption.  Kim  and  Roemer  (1981)  use  the  original  Chenery  and 
Syrquin (1975) equations, without re-estimating them, to determine expected values for the South Korean economy. Chenery 
and Syrquin themselves have not really used their analysis to build benchmarks. Their studies remain one step removed. Hopf 
2004 offers a replication of their approach with our dataset and explicit benchmarking purpose. 
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different levels of development. Additionally, it must be noted that the time period for the regression is 
not specified and many of the variables are not significant. 
 
Yahiro and Oishi’s (1997) simultaneous equations model for the Japanese economy also struggles 
with a number of methodological problems. The equation model still exhibits autocorrelation of its 
residuals visible through low DW statistics, which can be due to either misspecification of the model 
or a missing lag structure or both. Moreover, the model uses the OLS technique with most likely non-
stationary variables, which creates the problem of spurious regressions results. At the analytical level, 
the general problem of using past data to forecast future data, i.e. the underlying assumption that 
elasticities  and  thus  preferences  of  the  population  remain  unchanged  in  average,  can  be  viewed 
critically. Overall, even if one disregards this potential analytical pitfall the methodological problems 
already render results far from robust. 
 
A related literature, of which Besanger et al. (2000) is the example which specifically refers to 
Singapore, tries to construct a macro-economic model of the respective economies based on utility 
theory and resulting production functions in order to predict future, socially optimal levels of savings 
allowing for a variety of factors such as changing demographic structures, labor productivity and 
consumption demands.
19 Besanger et al. (2000) have applied this technique to five Asian countries, 
among  them  Singapore,  largely  to  forecast  the  country’s  future  saving  path.  The  years  of  their 
resulting predictions of optimal savings, for which we now have actual data, 1996-99, would argue 
that Singapore saved in excess of the country’s optimal level of just above 30% of GDP. Our study 
does not follow this literature, because of the inherent conceptual differences between socially optimal 
savings and to-be-expected savings. It is far from reasonable to equate optimal achievements with 
those, which are actually to be expected.
20 Furthermore, the necessary assumptions on the rate of time 
preferences, rate of technological progress, wealth to consumption ratios, planning horizons, interest 
rates, depreciation rates, elasticity of output to capital, elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour etc. and, even more, the development of these factors over time make the results very sensitive. 
Moreover,  such  an  analysis  will  not  allow  for  a  separation  of  policy  and  non-policy  induced 
circumstances. Therefore, this technique cannot be used to determine what could have been expected 
of Singapore given its circumstances.
21 
                                                       
19 For a description of the exact economic modelling exercise see Guest and McDonald (1998 as well as 1999). 
20 In a theoretically related exercise Masson and Tyron (1990) estimate a consumption function using regression 
analysis in order to derive a set of elasticities, which are in turn inserted into a macro-economic model developed by the IMF 
(MultiMode) to forecast the different effects of aging on the economic situation of seven industrialised countries, including 
their saving behaviour. 
21 The by far largest part of the cross-country saving literature is content with finding the significant explanatory 
variables without an attempt to derive benchmark saving values. For a summary of this literature with special reference to 
Singapore see Hopf (2006).  
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4. Findings 
4.1 Non-Policy Models 
What kind of saving performance could have been expected of post-independence Singapore 
given  the  country’s  situation  at  time  of  independence,  geographic  location  and  its  population’s 
demographic development over time, i.e. the country’s exogenous circumstances? 
 
In order to maximise the sample size the initial fixed-effects model has been built in a specific-to-
general approach starting with the description of the initial situation in 1965, which also includes the 
most  likely  strongest  explanatory  variable: the average  GDS-ratio  for  1962-64.  Demographic  and 
geographic  variables  were  included  in  consecutive  steps.  Finally,  regional  dummies  and  then  the 
demographic-geographic variable capturing the exposure to malaria in a given country were added. 
Table One offers the results. 
 
Table 1: Initial Situation, Demographics and Geographics 
 
  1965-99 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Const  5.579  5.404  -4.849  -8.188  6.627  5.439 
IniGds  0.68  0.708  0.648  0.667  0.621  0.641 
IniGDP    -7.99E-04 -2.69E-03 -2.60E-03 -1.21E-03 -9.25E-04 
Urb      0.106  0.067  0.069  0.077 
ToTPop      1.00E-08  6.68E-09  not sig.  not sig. 
EcoAcRat      0.126  0.227  not sig.  not sig. 
Airdist        -2.44E-04 not sig.  not sig. 
Tropicar        2.25  2.96  not sig. 
Landlock        -4.00  -5.83  -4.85 
Pop100km        not sig.  -4.59  -4.62 
Asia          10.1  10.8 
Sahara          -4.03  -5.56 
LA          -1.98  not sig. 
MalFal66            5.38 
             
N  2,820  2,716  2,716  2,424  2,424  2,322 
adj. R-sqr.  0.332  0.340  0.375  0.410  0.445  0.456 
Predicted  Avr. 
Saving 
Rate for Singapore 
8.96%  8.57%  16.14%  16.69%  24.48%  22.11% 
[not-sig = removed based on joint-hypothesis testing and equation re-estimated without this variable] 
 
The  immediate  result  from  this  exercise  is  that  Singapore’s  saving  performance  remains 
extraordinary given the country’s initial situation, demographic and geographic profile. Unless we 
allow for peer-group effects via regional dummies the saving rate, which could have been expected of 
Singapore, would have been below the actual world average. What is of further interest, however, is 
that given the country’s demographics, particularly its high urbanization-ratio, the country must have 
had a strong potential to increase its saving performance beyond the initial, ‘inherited’ saving rate. 
Furthermore, if we accept peer-group effects which might have driven Singapore’s savings it could 
have  been  expected  of  Singapore  to  achieve  above  average  saving  rates  similar  to  its  successful 
regional neighbours.  Hopf - HSBA Working Paper-Nr. 02/2009       9
From a statistical point-of-view, it is striking how strong the explanatory power of the initial 
GDS-ratio is. This inertia effect is the by-far strongest variable in any of the above equations, with 
consistently high beta-coefficients never below 0.5 and always the highest of all beta-coefficients. The 
somewhat surprising negative sign for the initial level of per capita GDP appears to support the view 
that this variable is rather an indicator for a country’s stage of development than its saving potential. It 
seems to measure whether the country is a mature economy with high income but low savings or a 
developing  economy  with  high  investments/savings  but  comparatively  low  income.  It  is  also  of 
interest to note how the ratio of the economically active population, the total size of the population as 
well  as  the  distance  from  the  nearest  commercial  centre  all  lose  their  significance  once  regional 
dummies are included. This seems to suggest that these regional dummies capture the demographic 
and distance effects. Similarly, the inclusion of the country’s exposure to malaria makes the regional 
dummy for Latin-American countries and the degree of exposure of the country to tropical climates 
lose their significance. This seems to suggest that the effect of both these variables on a country’s 
saving performance might be driven by the economic impact of malaria. However, the positive sign of 
the malaria variable, while the Latin American dummy had a negative sign and the tropics variable a 
positive sign, makes this conclusion rather precipitate. In general, these results concerning the loss of 
significance upon inclusion of other variables should not be over-interpreted due to the good but not 
excellent r-squareds, which hint at the likelihood that still missing variables might yet again change 
the significance of the variables included so far. It must also be noted that some equations suffer from 




In order to investigate the behaviour of both the statistical qualities of the models as well as the 
resulting benchmark saving rate over time, annual models were estimated. In order to keep the ratio of 
sample size and number of variables tested at a level which still allows for a qualified benchmark, a 
two step procedure was used in which first a set of variables describing the initial situation as well as 
the demographic and geographic profile is reduced in a general-to-specific procedure to include only 
those variables still significant and then in a second step regional dummies are added, which are 
subsequently reduced to only those which add significantly to the model. The initial situation was 
described by the countries’ average saving ratio for the years 1962-64 and their respective average per 
capita income for the same years (measured in current US dollars). The demographic development is 
captured  by  the  proportion  of  the  population  aged between  15  and  64  and  the  urbanization  rate. 
Describing the geographic profile of a country, the Gallup-Sachs-Mellinger variables were used again: 
the countries’ distance from the nearest international economic centre, the proportion of the population 
living within 100 kilometres from the coast, the proportion of the country with tropical climates as 
well  as  a  dummy,  describing  whether  the  country  is  landlocked.  Regional  dummies  for  Latin 
American and Sub-Saharan countries were employed together with the Asian dummy. 
 
Table 2 shows the results from this investigation. If the individual variable does not have a 
coefficient associated with it in the table, the variable was not able to remain in the model. Some years 
can have two models if one or more of the regional dummies significantly improved the first-step 
equation. The last two columns offer the predicted benchmark saving rate for Singapore next to the 
country’s actual saving rate. 
                                                       
22 In a detailed sensitivity analysis (see Hopf 2004) a number of institutional variables as well as alternative measures 
of income and demography were tested. While the significance of some variables changed due to these alterations, the overall 
finding  of  substantially  higher  actual  than  expected  savings  for  Singapore  given  the  country’s  strictly  non-policy 
circumstances was not contradicted. 
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Table 2: Annual Non-Policy Models 
 
  Cst  Initial 
GDS 
Initial 









lock  Airdist  Asia  Sa-











1965  1.02  0.98                     72  0.87   5.92   9.86 
1966  0.22  1.03                     72  0.85   5.36   13.71 
1967  0.74  1.05  -1.95E-03                   72  0.83   5.07   13.75 
1968  1.02  1.05  -1.91E-03                   72  0.80   5.38   18.35 
1969  2.05  1.04  -2.17E-03                   72  0.77   6.23   18.03 
1969  1.82  1.02  -1.93E-03              4.76     72  0.77   10.79   18.03 
1970  3.33  0.99  -2.15E-03                   72  0.71   7.26   18.35 
1970  3.08  0.97  -2.19E-03              5.04     72  0.72   11.94   18.35 
1971  2.49  0.95                     71  0.71   7.23   18.92 
1971  2.19  0.94                5.49     71  0.72   12.37   18.92 
1972  3.54  0.94                     71  0.65   8.20   24.58 
1973  5.06  0.95                     71  0.55   9.77   29.29 
1974  3.84  1.09                     71  0.53   9.25   29.07 
1975  2.22  0.99                     71  0.54   7.13   29.41 
1976  3.58  0.97                     71  0.48   8.40   32.64 
1977  4.22  0.89                     71  0.45   8.67   33.51 
1977  8.54  0.78                  -7.12   71  0.48   12.42   33.51 
1978  4.56  0.68          5.97           71  0.45   13.90   33.99 
1978  9.93  0.62          0.04      8.29  -6.47   71  0.50   21.36   33.99 
1979  3.36  0.95                     69  0.48   8.10   36.32 
1979  7.77  0.84                  -7.28   69  0.51   11.93   36.32 
1980  2.19  0.97                     69  0.48   7.02   38.08 
1980  6.45  0.86                  -7.06   69  0.50   10.73   38.08 
1981  -2.68  0.75    0.14                 69  0.49   15.35   41.29 
1981  3.48  0.73    0.07              -6.92   69  0.51   13.82   41.29 
1982  -2.83  0.57  -4.31E-03  0.23                 70  0.36   21.06   44.04 
1983  2.57  0.75                     70  0.31   6.32   46.55 
1983  6.62  0.61                10.27  -7.47   70  0.35   19.94   46.55 
1984  -0.73  0.56    0.15                 69  0.32   17.16   46.29 
1984  -0.21  0.59    0.11            13.00     69  0.35   26.23   46.29 
1985  8.95  0.51            -8.27         69  0.29   11.49   40.62 
1985  7.72  0.50            -6.98    13.22     69  0.34   23.43   40.62 
1986  -42.84  0.56  -5.28E-03    0.92               69  0.31   22.61  38.19 
1986  -24.01  0.54  -3.62E-03    0.55          11.27     69  0.34   27.61  38.19 
1987  -58.68  0.40      1.12  7.51             68  0.29   30.78  38.12 
1987  -34.53  0.43      0.69  5.30        13.04     68  0.33   35.04  38.12 
1988  -54.04  0.49  -5.43E-03    1.15               68  0.31   28.47  41.29 
1989  -55.38  0.49  -4.46E-03    1.16               68  0.36   28.87  43.36 
1990  -54.27  0.54  -6.94E-03    1.14               68  0.41   28.37  43.59 
1991  -66.00  0.34  -1.61E-02    1.71    -14.1  -9.59  -1.42E-03       67  0.50   31.12  45.54 
1992  -67.28  0.35  -5.80E-03    1.38               67  0.44   31.77  46.39 
1992  -50.90  0.34  -4.57E-03    1.07          10.22     67  0.46   36.32  46.39 
1993  -61.29  0.41  -4.35E-03    1.24               67  0.41   38.22  45.77 
1993  -41.12  0.40  -2.90E-03    0.86          12.83     67  0.45   34.29  45.77 
1994  -47.85  0.27      0.99  6.87    -11.86         67  0.42   31.03  48.50 
1994  -22.20  0.31      0.54  4.68    -12.84    12.82     67  0.45   35.50  48.50 
1995  -27.32  0.26      0.72      -7.87         67  0.34   25.00  50.03 
1995  -6.89  0.29      0.33      -8.82    13.54     67  0.39   31.85  50.03 
1996  9.82      0.19        -11.00         67  0.23   28.42   50.67 
1996  10.29      0.16        -10.59    11.97     67  0.27   37.76   50.67 
1997  -35.63  0.33      0.80               67  0.34   23.09  52.23 
1997  -19.72  0.37      0.50          11.40     67  0.37   29.12  52.23 
1998  -30.26        0.80      -8.51         66  0.34   26.58  52.43 
1998  -8.69        0.42      10.04    14.01     66  0.41   34.91  52.43 
1999  -41.09        0.99      -5.78         63  0.47   28.78  51.73 
1999  -26.60        0.73      -6.92    9.54     63  0.51   34.60  51.73 
Light grey background describes the fact that the variable was not significant anymore once regional dummies were added 
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Analytically,  two  immediate  findings  result  from  the  investigation:  Firstly,  it  should  not  be 
surprising to see Singapore achieve at least world average saving rates by the mid-1980s given her 
exogenous circumstances, particularly her favourable demographic development. Allowing for peer-
group effects captured by the Asian dummy variable raises the expected savings even above world 
average levels. Secondly, Singapore was able to consistently go beyond this benchmark.  
 
While a substantial improvement in Singapore’s saving behaviour beyond her initial situation and 
eventually beyond world averages should not be surprising, the actually achieved saving ratios remain 
beyond expectable levels given the country’s strictly non-policy environment as is the speed and 
degree of the transformation before 1980. 
 
Statistically, three findings stand out. Firstly, it must be noted how long the period of significance 
of the saving inertia actually lasts. Not until after a period of over 30 years is the effect of the initial 
saving rate overcome in the world sample. Secondly, some variables, which were still significant 
within  the  fixed-effects  models,  lose their statistical  powers,  particularly  the geographic  variables 
become very erratic. Only the landlocked dummy was strong enough to appear consistently at least in 
the later half of the period. Chenery-Syrquin’s measure for the size of the economy, i.e. its total 
population, was never able to survive the general-to-specific removal process. Thirdly, the fact that the 
adjusted r-squared falls in line with the loss of explanatory power of the inertia variable points to the 
fact that a number of important influences do not seem to be captured yet in the model. The behaviour 
of individual variables also suggests that the model is not yet fully robust. 
 
4.2 Extending the model 
International cross-sectional analyses, which try to explain savings, often include such purely 
policy  induced  variables  as  the  government’s  budget  balance  or  the  countries  respective  pension 
systems and such strongly policy induced variables as inflation or interest rates. This study avoids 
these  explanatory  factors  because  it  does  not  attempt  to  explain  cross-country  saving  behaviour. 
Instead it tries to determine exactly how much can be attributed to policy by controlling only for non-
policy  induced  variables.  However,  there  are  a  number  of  factors  which  are  often  targeted  by 
government policy but can not be brought about by their own doing, i.e. they depend to a substantial 
degree on exogenous forces. For Singapore, two of the main ingredients to the country’s economic 
development plan are such factors: her export performance and net-foreign-direct-investments. Both of 
these were clearly targeted by Singapore’s economic policies, but by their nature depend largely on the 
actions of third parties outside of government control. Even if such actions could be induced by such 
means as tax regimes, these facilitating policies are certainly not created to improve saving ratios.  
 
This section will try to control for the country’s net-export and FDI performance together with the 
already  introduced  strictly  non-policy  factors.  Additionally,  per  capita  income  will  be  tested as a 
potential explanatory factor, because it is such a fundamental variable and is not fully within the 
government’s realm of influence. As with the non-policy models above initially fixed-effects models 
were estimated followed by annual regression analyses. 
 
In order to maximise the sample size and to make the respective effects of the individual variables 
stand out more, the battery of independent variables was added in a specific-to-general fashion starting 
with  the  variable  with  the  largest  sample  size.  Using  the  joint-hypothesis  F-test,  the  resulting 
regression equation was then reduced to include only those variables, which add to the model in a 
statistically  significant  way.  The  Net-FDI  ratio  was  added  last,  because  the  variable  offers 
observations only from the 1970s onwards. Table 3 presents the results. 
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Table 3: Fixed-Effects Models 
 
  1965-99 
Cst  21.471  3.124  0.720  2.102  9.566  5.115  17.356  13.829 
NetExRat  0.796  0.775  0.788  0.851  0.83  0.769  0.751  0.758 
Urb    5.39E-02  5.21E-02  4.35E-02  7.39E-02  3.03E-02  5.44E-02  6.01E-02 
EcoAcRat    0.271  0.324  0.315  0.159  0.233  not sig.  0.109 
GDPpcAt      -1.05E-04  -1.45E-04  -1.13E-04  Not sig.  not sig.  not sig. 
Pop100Km        1.797  not sig.  2.486  not sig.  not sig. 
Landlock        not sig.  not sig.  Not sig.  -0.932  not sig. 
Airdist        -2.23E-04  not sig.  -1.46E-04  1.86E-04  1.50E-04 
Tropicar        -0.658  not sig.  -2.384  -1.639  -1.114 
IniGDS            0.185  0.161  0.156 
IniGDP            -2.40E-03  -1.62E-03  -1.86E-03 
NetFDI                 
Asia          7.315    6.988  6.136 
LA          -2.291    -2.270  -2.470 
Sahara          -2.532    -3.201  -3.211 
Time-Dum.                Yes 
                 
N  4,587  4,386  4,021  3,513  3,513  2,314  2,314  2,314 
Adj. R-sqr.  0.686  0.705  0.714  0.766  0.784  0.778  0.793  0.803 
Predicted 
Avr.  Sav.  20.56  25.61  25.65  25.12  32.92  21.88  28.33  29.13 
 
  1972-99 
Cst  10.824  19.498  16.427 
NetExRat  0.809  0.782  0.791 
Urb  not sig.  2.74E-02  7.51E-02 
EcoAcRat  0.165  Not sig.  not sig. 
GDPpcAt  not sig.  Not sig.  not sig. 
Pop100Km  3.284  Not sig.  not sig. 
Landlock  not sig.  -1.370  not sig. 
Airdist  not sig.  2.51E-04  2.19E-04 
Tropicar  -4.308  -2.749  -1.961 
IniGDS  0.126  9.77E-02  7.44E-02 
IniGDP  -2.16E-03  -1.27E-03  -1.74E-03 
NetFDI  0.690  0.636  0.700 
Asia    8.520  8.270 
LA    -1.970  -3.060 
Sahara    -3.370  -3.660 
Time-Dum.      Yes 
       
N  1,754  1,754  1,754 
Adj. R-sqr.  0.767  0.787  0.801 
Predicted Avr. Sav.  28.11  36.04  39.56 
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Given  the  country’s  resource  balance,  demographics  and  geographics,  as  well  as  its  initial 
situation, above world average savings should have been expected based on the fixed-effects models. 
Once all explanatory dimensions are included Singapore’s expected average savings is very close to 
the country’s actual saving rates.  
 
In order to further probe this finding, annual models were estimated following the same combined 
specific-to-general and general-to-specific approach. Annual models with the resource balance, the 
urbanization-ratio and the economically active proportion of the population predict saving ratios for 
Singapore above world average, but below actual. The transition to saving rates beyond the initial 
levels  was  also  to  be  expected.  Statistically,  it  is  striking  that  the  urbanization-ratio  loses  its 
significance in the late 1970s, while the economically active proportion of the population does not 
become significant until the 1980s. Adding geography and per capita income variables does not alter 
these findings. Moreover, income is rarely significant and the several geographic variables exhibit a 
very erratic significance with no clear pattern. Adding the inertia variable and the initial income levels 
alters  the  results  somewhat.
23  The  early  years  until  the  first  half  of  the  1970s  have  much  lower 
predicted saving rates than without modelling the initial situation. Particularly, the inertia variable 
lowers the expected saving rates, which is also at least partly due to the fact that the urbanization-ratio 
loses its significance in those years and is thus removed from the equation. However, from the mid-
1980s  onwards,  particularly  once  the  economically  active  proportion  of  the  population  becomes 
statistically significant, benchmark savings rise to levels substantially above world average. In other 
words, the model would still predict a strong transition from Singapore’s early saving rates to levels 
above world average. Consequently, for the whole period, this yields an average benchmark saving 
rate of slightly above world levels. Adding regional dummies does not materially alter this finding, 
although the Asian dummy proves significant in all but six years. The average saving rate is increased 
somewhat but still remains substantially below the actual level. The transition to higher savings is 
predicted to be somewhat faster than without the regional dummies but still not as fast as if the initial 
situation remained outside of the model. Adding Net-FDI, however, does increase the expected saving 
rate substantially, even if the inertia variable is included in the equation.
24 The model even predicts 
savings above the actual levels for individual years. Overall the average benchmark savings for 1972-
99 is 34.5 percent of GDP compared to an actual of 41.2 percent. If regional dummies are included, 
this average predicted saving level rises further to 37.5 percent.
25 
 
Overall, the findings from the extended models support the earlier results, namely that Singapore 
saved more than could have been expected of the country given its strictly non-policy circumstances. 
However,  once all  three  explanatory  dimensions  (non-policy,  external  and peer-group)  are jointly 
controlled for, Singapore’s actual savings turn out to be very close to expected levels. It should not be 
surprising  that  Singapore  was  able  to  raise  her  saving  rate  substantially  beyond  her  saving 
performance  at  time  of  independence  and  by  the  mid-1980s  to  above  world  average  levels. 
Furthermore, rather than the world-record saving rates of the 1990s, which usually attract the most 
                                                       
23  GDP  per  capita  had to be  removed  from  the  model  once  the initial  GDP  level  was  included due  to  a  strong 
correlation between the two variables. 
24 It is noteworthy, that this positive and significant impact of FDI on savings is in contrast with parts of the FDI-
literature. For a summary see for example Kentor (1998) who argues that FDI dependence can have a long-run negative 
impact.  Similarly  to  dependency  theory  he  argues  that  an  economy  controlled  by  foreign  interests  would  not  develop 
organically  (p.  1025):  “It  would  grow  in  a  disarticulated  manner.  The  natural  linkages  that  would  evolve  from  locally 
controlled capital would not occur. Profits would be exported. The interests of the ruling elite would be allied with those of 
owners of the foreign capital. Income inequality would grow. The economy would stagnate.” 
25 It must be noted, however, that once Net-FDI and regional dummies are included the restricting influence of the 
inertia variable only rarely proves to be significant and is thus removed from many annual models. 
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attention, the annual analysis points to the first half of the 1970s and if we allow for saving inertia also 
the late 1960s as Singapore’s most sustained period of extraordinary savings.
26 
 
4.3 Models without removal of variables 
So far, only the results from models, from which any insignificant variables have been removed, 
were discussed. However, one can argue that in order to calculate a benchmark for Singapore, all 
potentially  important  variables  should  be  included  in  the  models  even  though  they  might  not  be 
statistically significant for the world sample in a certain given year. This would allow the benchmark 
process to continuously control for all factors and thus result in a more consistent benchmark over 
time instead of being forced to use different models for different years. Moreover, since the equations 
will not change from year to year, the stepwise revision of Singapore’s deceptive extra-ordinarity will 
become  more  visible.  Statistically,  the  difference  to  the  regression  models  with  only  significant 
variables  should  not  be  too  substantial  since  the  removal  of  the  variables  was  based  on  a  joint-
hypothesis F-test, which determines whether the full equation is significantly different with or without 
the variable. The benchmark results, however, are likely to differ somewhat more. Therefore, the 
following  section  functions  largely  as  a  narrative  device,  which  nicely  brings  the  findings  so  far 
obtained to a concluding point. 
 
Based on the experience from the earlier models, the following five equations were adopted in 
annual models: 
 
Model 1:   Net-export-ratio, urbanization rate and economically active population 
Model 2:   same as Model 1 plus Net-FDI 
Model 3:   same as Model 2 plus Asian regional-dummy 
Model 4:   same as Model 2 plus Initial-GDS-ratio and initial per capita GDP 
Model 5:   same as Model 4 plus Asian regional-dummy 
 
Table 4 summarises the outcome from these models. The last column gives the average over- or 
under-saving by Singapore. A positive (negative) number indicates that in average, Singapore saved 
more (less) than what the model would predict, controlling for the country’s circumstances. Figure 2 
shows the respective over-/(under-) saving for each year for models 1, 2, 4 and 5, contrasting the 
results with a comparison based merely on averages.
27 
                                                       
26  The  extended  models  were  also  tested  for  the  sensitivity  to  the  inclusion  of  institutional  variables  as  well  as 
alternatives for the used income and demography variables (see Hopf 2004). These variables, however, were not able to 
significantly alter the derived benchmark values. 
27 For the exact coefficients and their t-ratios for each year see Hopf  (2004). Geographic variables were not tested due 
to their erratic and largely insignificant performance in the earlier annual models. Institutional proxy variables were also not 
used since they will cause a substantial reduction of the sample size to a level which will make the findings extremely 
sensitive to the variations within the sample instead of the variance of the explanatory variables. Both of these types of 
variables as well as others which have not been employed so far will be tested via an extensive sensitivity analysis in the 
following  section,  which  will  also  include  a  Two-Stage-Least-Square  procedure  in  order  to  control  for  the  potentially 
endogenous nature of the Net-Export variable. 
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  Sample Size  Adj. R. Sqrd.  Average Benchmark 
  min-max  avr.  min-max  Avr.  Saving  Over/Under 
NetExRat + Urb + EcoAcRat  90 - 160  125.31  0.55-0.82  0.73  26.16  9.97 
+ Net-FDI  84 - 150  114.89  0.61-0.81  0.73  31.14  4.99 
+ Asia  84 - 150  114.89  0.61-0.82  0.74  37.93  -1.81 
             
+ Net-FDI + IniGDS + IniGDP  65 - 80  72.77  0.62-0.90  0.78  29.75  6.38 
+ Asia  65 - 80  72.77  0.64-0.90  0.79  34.76  1.37 
Net-FDI was only included from 1972 onwards due to limited data availability.  
 
Very  similar  to  the  earlier  findings,  these  models  confirm  that  Singapore  saved  in  average 
between  5  and  10  percent  of  GDP  more  than  would  be  expected  of  a  country  with  similar 
circumstances given a world sample. If one controls, however, for Singapore being part of a very 
successful peer-group of neighbouring countries, this ‘over-saving’ is almost completely neutralised. 
Therefore, the transition from the country’s low saving performance at time of independence should 
not be surprising, even if we allow for the country’s initial situation in the early 1960s affecting the 
subsequent years. Particularly, the country’s favourable demographic development, export and FDI 
success makes savings far above world average levels by the late 1970s the norm for Singapore. The 
transition to these above average saving rates, however, took place much faster and more strongly than 
could have been expected of the country, particularly if its weak starting position is taken into account. 
On the other hand, the world record saving rates in the 1990s – at least until the Asian crisis – become 
much less extraordinary. 
 
In terms of policy impact, it can be concluded that Singapore’s savings must have been positively 
affected by the country’s policies resulting in higher savings beyond what could have been expected of 
the country given its circumstances. This policy effect, however, is comparatively small in relation to 
strictly  non-policy  and  external  factors.  Furthermore,  the  policy  impact  can  be  econometrically 
explained by Singapore’s place within a particular peer-group of neighbouring countries. In other 
words Singapore exceeded its saving benchmark in average by between 5 and 10 percent of GDP, 
which, however, is in line with the saving behaviour of her regional ‘control group’. Singapore’s 
saving performance within an Asian perspective, therefore, is far from extraordinary. Even outside of 
this Asian perspective, the country’s saving is far less spectacular than a pure comparison of GDS-
ratios would indicate once a number of important non-policy and external circumstances are controlled 
for. Nevertheless, policies must have certainly increased the speed and strength of the transition in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s away from the country’s initial saving behaviour. 
 
Table 4: Annual Models without removal of insignificant variables 
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Figure  3  visually  shows  the  development  over  time  of  the  main  influential  variables  of  the 
regression models – except for those variables with fixed values such as those describing the initial 
situation. It becomes clear how extraordinary Singapore’s early saving performance was given the 
country’s highly negative resource balance and the still high yet falling dependency ratio. On the other 
hand, the ten years after Singapore’s recession in 1985/6 are far from extraordinary given her very 
successful external position by that time both in respect to the country’s net-exports as well as Net-
FDI and the by then very low dependency rate. 
Figure 2: Annual Models without removal of insignificant variables 
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Figure 3: Main Influential Variables 
Complete Model refers to Model 5 described above. Hopf - HSBA Working Paper-Nr. 02/2009       18
5. Conclusion 
Controlling for those explanatory variables exogenous to a country’s saving policies, which prove 
to be significant in modelling variation in GDS-ratios across a world sample, renders Singapore’s 
gross domestic saving performance significantly less spectacular. The article suggests that the key to 
understanding  Singapore’s  saving  behaviour  must  lie  in  the  turnaround  achieved  during  the  first 
decade  of  the  country’s  independence.  Looking  merely  at  the  country’s  more  recent  saving 
performance will not be able to answer how Singapore was able to achieve its world-record saving 
ratios. 
 
This study removes Singapore’s saving performance from its pedestal with the reputation of being 
hardly transferable and possibly not even desirable. Instead, the results of the benchmarking exercise 
clearly  show  the  transferability  of  at  least  the  saving  aspects  of  Singapore’s  economic  history. 
Moreover, this approach also highlights those circumstances, which are not directly related to saving 
policies but must be taken into consideration if transferability is assessed, particularly the demographic 
structure and external position. The cross-country saving analysis furthermore gives an indication to 
what degree these pre-requisites are likely to affect a country’s saving. 
 
In terms of policy impact, the study shows that Singapore’s savings must have been positively 
affected by the country’s policies resulting in higher savings beyond what could have been expected of 
the country given its circumstances. This policy effect, however, is comparatively small in relation to 
strictly non-policy and external factors, which are the strongest factors in the country’s transition from 
low  to  high  savings.  Not  more  than  one  third  can  be  attributed  to  policy  even  in  conservative 
estimates.  Furthermore, the  policy  impact  can  be  econometrically  explained by  Singapore’s  place 
within  a  particular  peer-group  of  neighbouring  countries.  In  other  words,  Singapore  exceeded  its 
saving benchmark in average by between five and ten percent of GDP per year, which, however, is in 
line with the saving behaviour of her regional ‘control group’. Singapore’s saving performance within 
an  Asian  perspective,  therefore,  is  far  from  extraordinary  and  even  within  a  world  sample,  the 
country’s saving is far less spectacular than a pure comparison of GDS-ratios would indicate. 
 
As a by-product of the exercise, it is also shown that export-promotion does not only allow a 
country to better exploit its comparative advantage but also allows the country to raise its saving levels 
and thus finance the further improvement and exploitation of this comparative advantage and possibly 
even to finance the creation of new comparative advantages. In turn, this can potentially open up a 
virtuous circle of development. Additionally, the cross-country regression analyses demonstrate that it 
is generally a lengthy process to alter a country’s saving performance. Saving inertia in the world 
sample takes over twenty years to lose its significance. 
 
The exercise lends further support to the view of a favourable starting position as proposed by 
Huff (1994) and Peebles and Wilson (2002) and thus goes against Singapore’s – or rather the PAP’s - 
own folklore, which describes Singapore in the 1960s as a backward fishing village.
28 This finding, 
however, does not lessen the achievement of the Singapore government and its people. Simply having 
the chance does not mean that one is able to realise the given opportunity. They did. 
 
 
                                                       
28  Huff  (1994,  p.1)  summarises:  “Post  independence  economic  development  in  Singapore  began  from  a  strong 
foundation and with very substantial advantages.” See also: Huff (1995, 422-23), Rodrick (1996), Peebles and Wilson (2002, 
pp. 24-26)  
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Data description and sources: 
If not stated otherwise the data was taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
extended  by  data for Taiwan,  which  is not recognised  by  the World  Bank,  taken  from  Taiwan’s 
Statistical Databook published by the country’s council for Economic Planning and Development. 
 
IniGds: Initial average gross-domestic saving ratios 1962-64 
IniGDP: Initial average per-capita income 1962-64, measured in current US dollars 
Urb: the share of the total population living in areas defined as urban in each country 
ToTPoP: Total population 
EcoAcRat: Rate of the economically active population defined as those aged between 15 and 64 as a 
share of total population. 
Airdist: minimum distance to the closest of any three main economic centres of the world: New York, 
Rotterdam or Tokyo (Gallup et al., 1999) 
Tropicar: percentage of land which lies in the geographical tropics (Gallup et al., 1999) 
Landlock: dummy variable, which takes the value of one if nobody in the respective country lives 
within 100km of a coastline. (Gallup et al., 1999) 
Pop100km: the proportion of the population living within 100km of the coastline (Gallup et al., 1999) 
Asia: dummy variable consisting of Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and China 
Sahara: dummy variable consisting of 46 sub-saharan African countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
(Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana,  Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  Mauritania, 
Mauritius,  Mayotte,  Mozambique,  Namibia,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Rwanda,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
LA: dummy variable comprising 20 Latin American countries: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  Guyana,  Honduras,  Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
MalFal66: the product of the faction of land subject to malaria times the fraction of Falciparum cases, 
i.e. the malignant from of malaria (Gallup et al., 1999) 
NetExRat: Net-Export ratio or Resource Balance 
GDPpcAt:  GDP  per  capita  adjusted  for  purchasing  power  parities  using  the  World  Bank’s  Atlas 
method 
NetFDI: Net-Foreign Direct Investment (only available from 1972 onwards), current US dollars 
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